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ESSAY 
CONSIDERING RECONSIDERING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH† 
In Reconsidering Judicial Independence, Professor Stephen Burbank revisits 
the nature of the relationship between judicial independence and judicial 
accountability1—a relationship that he has elucidated over the course of an 
illustrious career. As Burbank emphasizes, the continuing success of this 
dichotomy depends on preserving a balance between its halves. But forces 
generations in the making have led to a new assault on the independence of 
the judiciary in the age of Trump, which has put the future of the 
independence–accountability balance in doubt. The age-old rule-of-law 
paradigm, which posits that independent judges put aside their personal 
biases and follow the law, has been debunked by data showing that judges are 
subject to ideological and other influences, undermining this traditional 
justification for judicial independence.2 To avert the erosion and collapse of 
judicial independence, we must defend it with recourse to a different 
paradigm—a legal-culture paradigm. The legal-culture paradigm appreciates 
that independent judges are acculturated to apply and uphold the law as best 
they can, but also recognizes that judges have discretion that is subject to 
extralegal influences—influences that better accountability can manage. 
Reconsidering Judicial Independence is important for what Professor 
Burbank has to say about judicial independence, and I will get to that; but the 
piece is also a tour of “beautiful, downtown Burbank.”3 Like Burbank, 
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1 Stephen B. Burbank, Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty Years in the Trenches and in the 
Tower, 168 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 18 (2019). 
2 See, e.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 54 (2016) (describing empirical studies). 
3 HAL ERICKSON, “FROM BEAUTIFUL DOWNTOWN BURBANK”: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 
ROWAN AND MARTIN’S LAUGH-IN 1968–1973 (2000). 
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California in the aging turn of phrase from Rowan and Martin’s Laugh-In, the 
cityscape of Professor Burbank’s scholarship may not strike the untrained 
observer as eye-catching. His work is not divertingly shrill—it avoids juicy 
generalizations and overwrought conclusions and it includes no self-indulgent 
manifestos—although it does feature a 182-page law review article on the 
history of the Rules Enabling Act.4 Also like Burbank the town, which was 
home to one of the most powerful television networks of its era, Burbank the 
scholar’s body of work is home to one of the most important and influential 
thinkers (and doers) in American law. And to no small extent, the less than 
ostentatious profile of his scholarship’s skyline is a key to its greatness: he is 
more interested in getting it right than espousing splashy conclusions the data 
cannot support, making friends in high places, or being lionized as the hero 
of any particular cause. Burbank’s scholarship eschews self-indulgent flash, in 
favor of making an enduring contribution to the administration of justice. 
My scholarship has touched on the subject of judicial independence more 
than a few times as well. In the spirit of full disclosure, I am the Mini-Me to 
Burbank’s Dr. Evil. When Burbank was working with the House Judiciary 
Committee on matters related to judicial discipline, I was serving as counsel 
to the  Committee. As a fledgling academic, I was a consultant to the National 
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, on which Professor 
Burbank served as member and scribe. I was the director of the American 
Judicature Society’s (AJS) Center for Judicial Independence; Burbank was on 
the AJS Executive Committee. I also edited WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH 
IT: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE—to 
which Professor Burbank contributed a chapter that he discusses in his 
article.5 Suffice it to say that we have studied the same issues and analyzed 
them in similar ways, which makes me a well-positioned reviewer of 
Burbank’s judicial independence scholarship and service. 
 
4 Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). Despite 
its girth, this is one hell of an article that is required reading for anyone who teaches or writes on 
litigation procedure. Moreover, it deserves an honorable mention here because the Rules Enabling 
Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018)), did 
more than authorize the federal courts to promulgate their own procedural rules. Taken together 
with legislation of the same era that established both the Judicial Conference of the United States 
(originally denominated the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges), Pub. L. No. 67-298, § 2, 42 Stat. 
837, 838 (1922) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2018)), and the Administrative Office of 
U.S. Courts, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223 (1939) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 601 
(2018)), and transferred budgetary control of the courts from the executive to judicial branch, id., 
the Rules Enabling Act did much to assist in establishing a more independent judicial branch in the 
first half of the twentieth century. 
5 Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science, and Humility, in 
WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT 
STAKE 41 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011). 
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I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
AS THE COIN OF THE REALM 
Burbank was not the first to recognize a relationship between judicial 
independence and accountability. If one stands in the field of judicial 
independence scholarship and swings a salmon, one is likely to hit half a 
dozen articles that dwell on this important relationship.6 Burbank’s article 
underscores the essential starting point for any conversation about judicial 
independence: the conception of independence and accountability as two 
sides of the same coin. In a system of government where the judiciary is called 
upon to uphold the rule of law on a case-by-case basis, independence and 
accountability each legitimate the other. Without independence, a judge can 
be driven by fear or favor to disregard the law and reach whichever conclusion 
will mollify those upon whom the judge is dependent. Without 
accountability, a judge can be liberated to disregard the law and reach 
whichever conclusion suits her fancy. And by conceptualizing judicial 
independence and accountability in terms of the consequences that flow from 
their absences, we can see both, as Burbank emphasizes, not as ends in 
themselves, but as instrumental values that protect other objectives: the rule 
of law, due process, and access to justice.7 
Likening judicial independence and accountability to two sides of the 
same coin also emphasizes that independence and accountability must be in 
a state of relative equilibrium. If that equilibrium is corrupted and the coin is 
weighted to skew the toss in favor of independence or accountability, the 
virtues of both—which depend upon their balance—are lost. For an 
interdisciplinary scholar like Professor Burbank who stands with one foot in 
theory and the other in practice, this is where life gets tricky. Judges and the 
lawyers who appear before them are often more protective of independence 
as a means to curb intrusions upon their province, while legislators and the 
general public that they represent tend to be more earnest about promoting 
judicial accountability to the people judges serve.8 Many academic lawyers, 
who have opted into a profession steeped in legal norms, find judicial 
 
6 See generally, e.g., Stephen Kelson, Judicial Independence and the Blame Game: The Earliest Target 
is a Sitting One, 15 UTAH B.J., Jan./Feb. 2002, at 14; Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2168 (2006); Ryan L. Souders, A Gorilla at the Dinner Table: Partisan Judicial Elections in the 
United States, 25 REV. LITIG. 529 (2006); Thomas Tinkham, Applying a Rational Approach to Judicial 
Independence and Accountability on Contemporary Issues, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1633 (2011); Edward 
H. Trompke, A Natural Tension, 62 OR. ST. B. BULL., Feb./Mar. 2002, at 9; Frances Kahn Zemans, The 
Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625 (1999). 
7 Burbank, supra note 1, at 24; see Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial 
Politics?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 238-44 (2012) (noting that the “ermine myth”—that independent 
judges are influenced by facts and laws alone—is antiquated, but that independence nonetheless 
promotes the rule of law, due process, and justice). 
8 See generally GEYH, supra note 2. 
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independence easier to embrace than many political scientists, who, by virtue 
of their training, are more likely to think of judges as politicians in robes for 
whom independence is problematic.9 
Against this backdrop, one cannot work and write in full-throated support 
of both judicial independence and accountability without alienating some 
people along the way or compromising one’s convictions. As implied by the 
trail of nonplussed acquaintances described in his essay, Burbank has opted 
in favor for his integrity and the courage of his convictions—a point he once 
punctuated to me privately with a colorful observation: “You can’t make 
chicken salad from chicken shit.” The extent to which Burbank has devoted 
his professional life to preserving the balance between independence and 
accountability is remarkable. While Burbank was the Chair of the AJS’s 
Editorial Board, he decried attacks against the independence of judges,10 
whom he criticized elsewhere for being insufficiently accountable to operative 
law in his writings critical of Judge Weinstein11 and the Supreme Court.12 By 
the same token, as an architect of disciplinary process reform, Burbank has 
strived to assure the accountability of judges whose autonomy he has 
defended in his scholarship on the architecture of judicial independence. 
In discussing how the two-sided coin of judicial independence and 
accountability is operationalized, Burbank references my work for the 
proposition that informal institutional norms have evolved to preserve the 
desired balance between judicial independence and accountability.13 Those 
independence norms emerged to dissuade Congress from exploiting the full 
panoply of its powers, which could all but obliterate the independent judiciary 
that the Framers sought to establish in their Constitution, by means of 
unrestrained impeachment, court-packing and unpacking, budget-slashing, 
 
9 See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHO IS TO JUDGE? THE PERENNIAL DEBATE OVER 
WHETHER TO ELECT OR APPOINT AMERICA’S JUDGES 117-19 (2019) (comparing the “legal and 
political science communities” in their respective approaches to understanding and explaining “the 
decisions and conduct of judges” in the context of judicial elections versus appointments); Eileen 
Braman & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Path Dependence in Studies of Legal Decision-Making, in WHAT’S LAW 
GOT TO DO WITH IT: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE, supra note 
5, at 114, 114 (“[P]olitical scientists are creatures of their training and professional socialization.”). 
10 Editorial, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads, 85 JUDICATURE 260, 260 (2002) (“[J]udicial 
independence is only a means to an end and . . . no society would want a judiciary that was 
completely independent and hence completely unaccountable.”). 
11 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in the 
Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 1974, 1984 (1997) (arguing that while “[a]ll of us would 
be better off if more federal judges emulated . . . Jack Weinstein[],” “certain aspects of [his] judicial work 
. . . may cause concern from the perspective of judicial independence and accountability”). 
12 See generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: 
THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017). 
13 Burbank, supra note 1, at 24 n.26 (citing CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & 
CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006)). 
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jurisdiction-stripping, defiance of court orders, and so on. I have characterized 
the balance these norms strike—between courts and Congress, independence and 
accountability—as a “dynamic equilibrium.”14 Episodic spikes of anticourt 
sentiment elicit proposals for Congress to bring the courts to heel, which are 
quieted with recourse to traditional independence norms that help to stay 
Congress’s hand—until the next transition of political power brings a new spike.15 
If this was where the story ended, it would be the Constitution’s corollary 
to a Hallmark after-school special that closes with courts and Congress, cast as 
toe-headed teens who have resolved their latest spat, walking down the bucolic 
road of institutional norms, flipping their independence–accountability coin as 
they bask in the sunshine of eternal equilibrium. But that is not where the story 
ends—a point to which Burbank alludes and which I want to develop here. 
II. OUT WITH THE OLD: THE ANTIQUATED  
RULE-OF-LAW PARADIGM 
To fully appreciate the precarious future that judicial independence faces, 
it is important to introduce two additional dichotomies that Professor 
Burbank discusses. The first is between diffuse and specific support for the 
courts. Diffuse support is systemic support, which respects the dynamic 
equilibrium between independence and accountability, aided by the evolution 
and entrenchment of norms, and enables judges to decide, as Burbank frames 
it, “What does the law require?”16 Diffuse support manifests as public 
confidence in the legitimacy of the judiciary that remains stable despite 
occasional decisions with which the public disagrees.17 Specific support, in 
contrast, is contingent support, in which the judiciary’s legitimacy in the 
public mind turns on “What have you done for me lately?”18 Specific support 
is volatile by nature, and sublimates the rule of law to the rule of majoritarian 
politics, by hinging public confidence in the courts on whether the public 
shares the policy outcomes of the courts’ decisions, rather than whether those 
decisions uphold operative law. 
 
14 GEYH, supra note 13, at 253-82. 
15 Charles Gardner Geyh, The Choreography of Courts–Congress Conflicts, in THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC 19, 19-20 (Bruce Peabody ed., 
2011) (summarizing the “predictable pattern” of periods of anticourt sentiment in the federal courts: 
“first comes political realignment; then attacks against holdover judges; counter-attacks against court 
critics; and, finally, normalization”). 
16 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 27 (“[P]olitical scientists refer to .	.	. the public’s diffuse support 
for the courts—support that persists even in the face of unpopular decisions, where so-called specific 
support is lacking.” (footnote omitted)). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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The second dichotomy that Burbank discusses is between law and policy. 
Like independence and accountability, Burbank notes that law and policy are 
two sides of the same coin: law implements policy, while policy informs the 
interpretation of law—they are inextricably intertwined.19 But here is where 
the story darkens. Preserving the balance between law and policy depends on 
preserving diffuse rather than specific support for the courts. If public support 
for the courts depends on specific support derived from judges implementing 
preferred policy outcomes, then the relevance of law is sublimated. And if law 
is sublimated to policy, this corrupts the related balance between independence 
and accountability: why afford judges independence from the control of the 
electorate or their elected representatives if courts are simply comprised of 
politicians in robes whose role is to implement the public’s policy preferences 
and preserve specific support for the courts? 
To recap, the American judiciary owes its long-term stability to an array 
of moving parts that preserves constructive tensions between independence 
and accountability, between courts and Congress, between law and policy, and 
between diffuse and specific public support for the courts. I have argued 
elsewhere that the balances struck across this array have been guided by a 
rule-of-law paradigm that informed the framing of the U.S. Constitution and 
that has structured our thinking about the judiciary in the generations since.20 
That paradigm, in brief, posits that if judges are afforded a measure of 
independence from political and popular pressure, they will disregard 
extralegal influences and impartially uphold the law on a case-by-case basis.21 
It is a paradigm that favors 1) robust independence, offset by just enough 
accountability to correct mistakes and catch rogues; 2) a Congress that defers 
to independence norms; and 3) courts that uphold the law without regard to 
their personal policy preferences—promoting diffuse support.22  
Judges repeat the rule-of-law paradigm like a mantra.23 But times are 
changing. Burbank begins his essay by noting that, “[j]udicial independence 
 
19 Id. at 25 (“Going down that path enables one quickly to grasp another essential proposition, 
which is that judicial independence and judicial accountability are not discrete concepts at war with 
each other. They are complements or, again, different sides of the same coin.”). 
20 GEYH, supra note 2, at 16-23. 
21 Id. at 18-19. 
22 Id. at 16-43. 
23 Justice Alito discussed the paradigm at length in his opening statement for his Supreme 
Court nomination, stating that 
The role of a practicing attorney is to achieve a desirable result for the client in the particular 
case at hand. But a judge can’t think that way. A judge can’t have any agenda . . . . [or] have any 
preferred outcome in any particular case . . . . The judge’s only obligation—and it’s a solemn 
obligation—is to the rule of law, and what that means is that in every single case, the judge has 
to do what the law requires. 
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is in the air—again.”24 True enough, but why? Is it because the latest round of 
judicial-independence talk is like the spring, cyclical and inevitable as the 
seasons? If so, we can proceed to the discussion secure in the knowledge that 
spring showers will yield to summer sun. Or is judicial independence in the air 
because the asteroid has landed and shot particulates skyward that presage the 
possibility of an extinction event? From where I sit, the answer is a little from 
column A and a little from column B. We are indeed entering the latest in a 
centuries-long series of anticourt cycles following the transition of power to the 
Trump Administration, but this latest cycle must be viewed against the backdrop 
of more serious and sustained developments, generations in the making, that 
have eroded the rule-of-law paradigm and threatened its longevity. 
I have elaborated on the sustained developments that jeopardize the rule-
of-law paradigm in prior work, and shorthand them here: 
 
• Beginning in the 1920s, American law schools spawned the legal 
realism movement.25 Legal realists challenged the “Santa Clause story 
of complete legal certainty.”26 They argued that when faced with legal 
indeterminacy, judges struggle between competing claims to decide 
what the law requires, and “since there is that struggle, how can they 
do otherwise than select the one that seems to them to lead to a 
desirable result”?27 
• As the legal realist movement in American law schools was winding 
down, the frequency of dissenting and concurring opinions on the 
U.S. Supreme Court increased measurably, beginning in 1941.28 
 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2006) 
(statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.). 
Justice Roberts also sought to allay Congress’s fear by resorting to analogizing judges to 
mere umpires calling balls and strikes, presumably constricted in judgment by the prescribed 
edges of the strike-zone. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 31 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
In 2015, then-Judge Kavanaugh gave a speech at the Catholic University of America entitled 
The Judge as Umpire, in which he reflected on the precise drafting of the National Football League’s 
rulebook in defining what is a “catch.” Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 
CATH. U. L. REV. 683, 690-91 (2016); see also Geyh, supra note 7, at 217-18 & n.142 (providing other 
examples of judges who have stated the importance of having a judiciary that follows the rule of law 
rather than its own partisan beliefs). 
24 Burbank, supra note 1, at 18. 
25 GEYH, supra note 2, at 46. 
26 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 260 (Anchor Books ed. 1963). 
27 Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 359 (1925). 
28 Cass Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 769, 780-83 (2015). 
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• Beginning in the 1940s, political scientists picked up the flag of the 
fallen realists, correlated majority and dissenting opinions to the 
ideological orientations of the justices, and developed an attitudinal 
model of Supreme Court decisionmaking, which posited that judges 
are influenced by their attitudes or ideologies.29 
• Beginning in earnest in the late nineteenth century, Supreme Court 
confirmation proceedings became increasingly fixated on the nominee’s 
political ideology and its impact on the nominee’s future rulings.30 That 
fixation would devolve into an obsession beginning in the 1980s and spill 
over into circuit and district court confirmations beginning in the 1990s.31 
• Beginning in the 1980s, state supreme court elections became “noisier, 
nastier, and costlier,”32 culminating in well-funded, ideologically 
driven battles to defeat incumbents because of their rulings on tort 
liability, capital punishment, criminal sentencing, same-sex marriage, 
water rights, and abortion.33 
• Beginning in earnest in the latter half of the twentieth century, state 
legislatures sought to relieve their supreme courts’ docket congestion 
by establishing intermediate courts of appeals,34 while Congress did 
the same by eliminating mandatory appeals for the U.S. Supreme 
Court.35 An unintended consequence was to limit high-court dockets 
to fewer, more indeterminate and ideologically charged cases.36 This 
change required the courts to focus more on making new law in 
controversial cases and focus less on correcting trial court errors in 
 
29 See generally C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL 
POLITICS AND VALUES 1937–1947 (1948) (using nonunaimous decisions to chart the political 
alignments and blocs of the “Roosevelt Court” justices). 
30 GEYH, supra note 13, at 214-15, 221. 
31 Id. 
32 David B. Rottman & Roy A. Schotland, What Makes Judicial Elections Unique?, 34 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1369, 1373 n.5 (2001) (quoting Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice for Sale?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1988, at 74). 
33 GEYH, supra note 2, at 55-61. One recent example is the latest, hotly contested Wisconsin 
Supreme Court race. See Laurel White, Wisconsin Supreme Court Race Too Close to Call, WIS. PUB. 
RADIO (Apr. 3, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-supreme-court-race-too-close-call 
[https://perma.cc/9U9W-2Y3A] (describing the “razor-thin margin” separating the candidates who 
both “vowed to serve as impartial justices on the court while pointing fingers at their opponent’s 
partisan affiliations and potential biases”). 
34 Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961, 966 
(1978) (finding that a “crucial development[]” in state court structure was “the establishment of 
intermediate appellate courts between the trial courts and supreme courts”). Congress had similarly 
established federal intermediate appellate courts in the Judiciary Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-517, 26 
Stat. 82. See Geyh, supra note 15, at 20-21 (referring to the Judiciary Act of 1891 as an instance where 
“Congress manipulated Court jurisdiction to limit the justices’ policy reach”). 
35 Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2018)). 
36 GEYH, supra note 2, at 32. 
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noncontroversial cases, to the end of repeatedly elevating the political 
profile of the courts involved.37 
• Media coverage of courts has also changed. Supreme Court decisions 
are routinely explained with reference to the ideological alignment of 
the majority and dissent.38 Cable news channels offer infotainment 
that features court coverage with a transparent ideological bias.39 
Furthermore, the internet has created a forum for citizen journalists—
unencumbered by professional norms that constrain the traditional 
media—who publish ideologically charged attacks on disfavored 
judges and their rulings.40 
 
This protracted series of developments has cut the rule-of-law paradigm 
to the quick. It suggests that independent judges do not set extralegal 
influences aside and nurtures the view that independence liberates judges to 
flout the law and indulge their ideological biases. The new skepticism 
underlying these developments is manifested in survey data. Significant 
majorities of the general public think that 1) federal judges are influenced by 
their ideological preferences;41 2) that state judges are influenced by the 
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 36. See generally MICHAEL F. SALAMONE, PERCEPTIONS OF A POLARIZED COURT: 
HOW DIVISION AMONG JUSTICES SHAPES THE SUPREME COURT’S PUBLIC IMAGE (2018) 
(finding that Supreme Court decisions with more dissenting justices receive more media coverage 
and are likelier to be framed in ideological terms). 
39 See GEYH, supra note 2, at 35-37 (“Insofar as the news is communicated in short, image-oriented 
segments, the public’s understanding of judges and the judiciary will, of necessity, be impressionistic.”); cf. 
Tom Rosentiel, Partisanship and Cable News Audiences, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/2009/10/30/partisanship-and-cable-news-audiences/ [https://perma.cc/D388-
3A7P] (“[T]here are stark differences in the partisan composition of the Fox News Channel, CNN and 
MSNBC audiences.”). Compare, e.g., Levin: Left’s Agenda is Incompatible with Constitutionalism (Fox News 
television broadcast June 29, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/levin-lefts-agenda-is-incompatible-
with-constitutionalism [https://perma.cc/F748-KCPJ] (arguing that liberals have turned the Court into a 
“politburo” and would oppose the confirmation of any conservative to replace Justice Kennedy),  
with Panelist Grills Kavanaugh’s Past Opinions (CNN television broadcast July 10, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/07/10/brett-kavanaugh-presidents-shielded-from-litigation-
bts-cpt-vpx.cnn [https://perma.cc/4T8M-KAP8] (debating then-Judge Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence on 
whether a sitting president should be shielded from litigation). 
40 GEYH, supra note 2, at 36. 
41 CAMPBELL PUB. AFFAIRS INST., MAXWELL POLL ON CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND 
INEQUALITY: LAW AND COURTS QUESTIONS FROM 2005 POLL (2005), 
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/campbell/data_sources/Law%20and%20Courts%20Que
stions%20from%202005%20Poll.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QUT-B6ZY]. 
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campaign support they receive;42 and 3) that judges say that they are 
following the law when in reality they are acting on their personal feelings.43 
III. IN WITH THE NEW: TRANSITIONING TO A  
LEGAL-CULTURE PARADIGM 
The extinction event scenario, then, is this: the ailing rule-of-law paradigm will 
eventually collapse. When it does, it will take with it the primary rationale for 
judicial independence: if judges are dissembling or delusional when they say that 
they follow the law and in reality abuse their independence by disregarding the law 
and imposing their own policy preferences, then judicial independence serves no 
useful purpose. The collapse of the rule-of-law paradigm will then create a power 
vacuum for partisan opportunists to fill with unprecedented forms of court control 
imposed for the putative purpose of promoting judicial accountability. 
To avert the possibility of this scenario materializing, I have proposed 
transitioning from the rule-of-law paradigm, which has served us long and well but 
outlived its utility, to a legal-culture paradigm. The legal-culture paradigm proceeds 
from the premise that beginning in law school, future judges are immersed in a 
legal culture that takes law seriously. At the same time, beginning in law school, 
future judges learn that in hard cases, the law is often indeterminate and that when 
choosing between two comparably plausible constructions of applicable law, a 
judge’s background, education, race, gender, ideology, and other extralegal factors 
can inform which construction the judge deems best.44 Note that independently 
upholding the operative law as impartially as possible remains as central to what 
judges do in the legal-culture paradigm as in its rule-of-law predecessor. The legal-
culture paradigm simply accommodates the empirical realities that law and policy 
are (with a nod to Burbank) two sides of the same coin and that in close cases, a 
judge’s reading of what the law requires can be informed by a judge’s policy 
perspectives. 
 
42 See James L. Gibson, Campaigning for the Bench: The Corrosive Effects of Campaign Speech?, 42 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 899, 920-21 (2008) (finding that policy pronouncements by state judicial 
candidates do not negatively affect public perceptions of this court but policy promises do); James 
L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and “New-Style” 
Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV., Feb. 2008, at 59, 59, 72 (concluding that acceptance of 
campaign contributions by state judicial candidates leads to a “diminution of legitimacy” for courts); 
James L. Gibson, “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns and the Legitimacy of State High Courts, 71 J. POL. 
1285, 1298-1300 (2009) (finding that acceptance of campaign contributions by state judicial 
candidates—not policy talk or attack ads—detracts from the institutional legitimacy of state courts). 
43 Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in WHAT’S LAW GOT 
TO DO WITH IT: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE, supra note 5, at 
306, 308-09 (“A majority of poll respondents agreed that even though judges always say that their 
decisions flow from the law and the Constitution, many judges are in fact basing their decisions on 
their own personal beliefs.”). 
44 Geyh, supra note 2, at 87-88. 
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In a legal-culture paradigm that defaults to the presumption that judges 
are acculturated to follow the law as best they can, independence serves three 
important purposes: 1) it buffers judges from external pressure to disregard 
the law in cases when the law is otherwise clear; 2) it promotes due process 
by enabling judges to give litigants their day in court (as good judges are 
acculturated to do) without external pressure to railroad litigants to achieve 
foreordained outcomes; and 3) it promotes justice by enabling judges to offer 
their best assessment of what the applicable facts and law are—unencumbered 
by external pressure to reach outcomes demanded by elected officials, interest 
groups, or voters, who lack the judge’s familiarity and commitment to 
upholding operative facts and law.45 
By acknowledging the empirical reality that judges are subject to 
extralegal influences, however, the legal-culture paradigm must also 
acknowledge the possibility that independence can liberate judges to go 
rogue, ignore the lessons of their legal culture, disregard the law, and impose 
their own policy preferences. For that reason, the legal-culture paradigm 
contemplates a more robust role for accountability, relative to the rule-of-law 
paradigm, to guard against maverick judges leaving the range. Here, the 
narrative returns to Burbank, who rightly debunks the notion that, except for 
the little-used impeachment process, Article III judges are effectively 
unaccountable.46 To the contrary, federal judges are accountable in myriad 
ways. They are accountable to higher courts, via appellate review.47 They are 
accountable to Congress, which oversees court budgets, size, structure, 
administration, practice, and procedure, and can pass legislation overriding 
the courts’ statutory interpretations.48 They are accountable to constitutional 
amendments that overturn court decisions.49 They are accountable to a 
disciplinary process that remediates judicial misconduct and disability.50 They 
are accountable to a code of conduct with which federal judges (below the 
Supreme Court) are bound to comply.51 They are accountable to a 
disqualification process, when judges act in ways that call their impartiality 
into question.52 They are accountable to each other and the mutual respect 
 
45 Geyh, supra note 15, at 90-100. 
46 Burbank, supra note 1, at 28-29. 
47 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1291 (2018). 
48 See generally GEYH, supra note 13 (exploring the federal judiciary’s independence from and 
accountability to Congress). 
49 Id. 
50 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364 (2018). 
51 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 
(2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective_ 
march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6P6-KEHQ]. 
52 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2018). 
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judges seek on collegial courts.53 And they are accountable to their oaths of 
office, when they swear to act impartially and perform the duties that the U.S. 
Constitution requires.54 
Some of the foregoing mechanisms hold judges accountable for bad 
decisions while others hold them accountable for biases, misconduct, and 
mismanagement that contribute to bad decisions. Either way, they offer a 
menu of alternatives to reassure a skeptical public that there are means to 
deter judicial independence gone rogue, which the judiciary should embrace 
and celebrate as critical to its legitimacy and as the price it must pay for its 
continuing independence. The balance that my legal-culture paradigm seeks 
to strike is decidedly Burbankian, for it effectively proposes to counter a 
sustained threat to judicial independence with better accountability. 
Ultimately, then, the task remains to peddle the legal-culture paradigm to 
the bench, bar, political branches, policy wonks, social scientists, media pundits, 
and public who must embrace it if it is to replace the ailing rule-of-law 
paradigm and recalibrate the balance between independence and accountability. 
That task is complicated, however, by the Trump Administration’s recent 
barrage of attacks upon the integrity of the courts, which challenges the 
proposed legal-culture paradigm by rejecting its premises.55 
President Trump has attacked judges for invalidating executive orders 
without reference to operative law, proceeding from the premise that good 
judges do not operate independently of the president but work with him to 
achieve his policy goals.56 He has taken issue with adverse judicial rulings, 
not by disputing their merits but by challenging the legitimacy of the judges 
 
53 See generally Harry T. Edwards, Collegial Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (N.Y. Univ. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research, Working Paper No. 17-47, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3071857 [https://perma.cc/XB7W-WC2S] (describing the importance of collegiality 
in courts and noting procedures that courts use to encourage collegiality in decisionmaking). 
54 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2018). 
55 See In His Own Words: The President’s Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
(June 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/his-own-words-presidents-attacks-courts 
[https://perma.cc/UXM5-4Q88] (compiling President Trump’s tweets that criticize the courts). 
56 See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Supreme Court Nominee Calls Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary 
“Demoralizing”, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/donald-trump-
immigration-ban.html?ref=politics&module=inline [https://perma.cc/242M-S5RJ] (quoting 
President Trump as saying, “If these judges wanted to, in my opinion, help the court in terms of 
respect for the court, they’d do what they should be doing”). 
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themselves with labels like “so-called,”57 “so political,”58 or “disgraceful.”59 To 
the consternation of the Chief Justice,60 the President has effectively 
stereotyped judges with reference to the president who appointed them.61 
The proposed legal-culture paradigm accepts empirical reality and legal 
realism by acknowledging circumstances in which ideology matters. The data 
shows that the public is at peace with judges who are subject to realist 
influences,62 but draws the line at judges who are perceived as nakedly 
partisan actors.63 There is an important difference between the judge who 
reaches result X because she thinks that X is what the law requires—even if 
her conservative or liberal ideology influenced her thinking—and the judge 
who reaches result X because X is what the judge’s appointing president would 
want. Describing judges categorically as “Obama judges” or “Trump 
 
57 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976 [https://perma.cc/8A3V-AP5Z] (“The 
opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is 
ridiculous and will be overturned!”). 
58 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:33 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/871679061847879682 [https://perma.cc/KD8M-78VF] 
(“In any event we are EXTREME VETTING [sic] people coming into the U.S. in order to help 
keep our country safe. The courts are slow and political!”). 
59 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2017, 8:15 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/830042498806460417 [https://perma.cc/BVS5-Y3BG] 
(“LAWFARE: ‘Remarkably, in the entire opinion, the panel did not bother even to cite this (the) 
statute.’ A disgraceful decision!”). 
60 Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump’s Criticism of “Obama Judge,” Chief Justice Roberts Defends 
Judiciary as “Independent”, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/rebuking-trumps-criticism-of-obama-judge-chief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-as-independent/ 
2018/11/21/6383c7b2-edb7-11e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html [https://perma.cc/4YSS-NFV2]. 
61 See Jessica Gresko, Judge Sides with Congress over Trump in Demands for Records, AP NEWS (May 
20, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/49d1caabd0124ef1b874eec67302c55d [https://perma.cc/E7EH-
TREA] (“[W]e think it’s totally the wrong decision by, obviously, an Obama-appointed judge.” (quoting 
Trump)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018, 3:51 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1065346909362143232 [https://perma.cc/3YJH-MMFH] 
(“Sorry Chief Justice John Roberts, but you do indeed have ‘Obama judges,’ and they have a much 
different point of view than the people who are charged with the safety of our country. It would be great 
if the 9th Circuit was indeed an ‘independent judiciary.’”). 
62 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the 
U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 195, 213 (2011) (“The American people know that the 
justices of the Supreme Court exercise discretion in making their decisions . . . . [L]egitimacy seems 
to flow from the view that discretion is being exercised in a principled, rather than strategic, way.”). 
63 JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND 
CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 123 
(2009) (finding through empirical research that, among other things, “[m]ost Americans recognize 
that judges engage in policy making” and accept this notion “to the extent that the discretion is 
exercised in a principled, non-self-interested fashion”). 
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judges”—and doubling down when the Chief Justice of the United States calls 
you out—crosses that line.64 
The ultimate strategy I propose is to meet in the middle, between the 
fading, fairytale world of the rule-of-law paradigm and the seventh circle of 
hell conjured by a president who regards judges as unprincipled, partisan 
agents for whomever appointed them. The legal-culture paradigm represents 
that middle ground 
 * * * 
In this piece, I have used Professor Burbank’s essay as a way to introduce 
and integrate some of my own ideas. That is possible because Burbank’s work 
on judicial independence is foundational. It creates a basic structure for 
thinking about judicial independence and accountability that serves as the 
starting point for future scholarship in the field. And that is one hell of a legacy. 
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